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Abstract 
 
This paper looks at hospitals’ organizational structure through an institutional lens in 
order to examine how these organizations respond to the institutional complexity of the 
healthcare sector. Drawing on multiple and complementary sources of data, extracted 
from a focus group study, a statistical national database and a survey inquiry, we 
investigate one structural response of French hospitals to the emergence of a new 
managerial logic bringing more complexity in their field. We observe that this response, 
namely the implementation of management control systems, addresses this complexity 
by combining different institutional logics in a segmented system of actors, and that 
this arrangement of logics is not a strict homothetic translation of its correspondent 
field logic. We use the concept of hybridity to describe the distribution of institutional 
logics guiding organizational actors’ behavior and conclude that cooperation within the 
system is related to the scope of action of most hybrid actors. We therefore contribute 
to the literature on institutional logics in healthcare by identifying organizational 
translation of field logics and hybrid actors’ agency as key parameters in the structural 
design of hospitals’ responses to institutional complexity.  
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Introduction 
Healthcare systems face a high level of institutional complexity due to prescriptions 
from multiple institutional logics (Greewood et al., 2011). As a consequence, the 
conceptual framework provided by institutional logics scholarship has proved fruitful to 
explain profound transformations of these systems, like the rise of managed care as a 
new logic challenging the dominance of professional and state logics (Scott et al., 
2000). Whereas managed care in the United States has strengthened both market and 
corporate logics (Nigam & Ocasio, 2010; Pouthier et al., 2013), evidence of a family 
(Heimer, 1999) or a community (Waldroff et al., 2013) logic can also be found in the 
literature.  
If these approaches unveil the institutional complexity at play in healthcare as a field, 
less academic interest has been paid to the translation of this complexity at the 
organizational level. Although some empirical studies give illuminating examples of 
strategic responses to institutional complexity in hospitals (Heimer, 1999), or of 
strategic and structural responses by health authorities (Reay & Hinings, 2009), they 
posit competition as a modus vivendi between actors bearing each one a single logic. 
Further research on how actors driven by a plurality of logics interplay within 
organizational structures in a competitive or cooperative fashion is therefore warranted 
in the healthcare sector. 
The purpose of this paper is to address this dearth of research by analyzing one of 
hospitals’ structural responses to the institutional complexity of their environment. As 
central organizations in their field (Battilana & Casciaro, 2012) hospitals are particularly 
“exposed to the tension that multiple logics engender” (Greewood et al., 2011: 319). 
Their structural responses to complexity may accordingly serve as a paragon for the 
other organizations of the same sector. 
One of these responses has been the flourishing of management control systems in 
the two thirds of French public and non-profit hospitals, with a 132% increase from 
2009 to 2014 (Source: French National Observatory on Analytical Accountings, 2014). 
Two field-level reforms, fostering a “managerial approach in hospitals” (Engel et al., 
2000), induced this development (Lartigau, 2009): the shaping of a more decentralized 
pattern of governance involving medical departments in corporate decision-making, 
and the implementation of an activity-based payment model for hospitals’ stays. 
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These reforms embraced the same characteristics as the ones of the managed care 
logic in the United States, placing emphasis on efficiency in the delivery of medical 
services through technological imperatives, market reforms, and cost control 
mechanisms (Dunn and Jones, 2010). We will show that the adequacy of management 
control in this context relies on its capacity to combine, at the organizational level, these 
incipient logics with the long-prevailing state and professional norms of the clinical 
practice (Foucault, 1963). 
 
Theoretical background 
Like Waldroff et al. (2013), we used Thornton’s (2004) inter-institutional system as an 
analytical framework to qualify the institutional logics at work in our scope of research. 
From this perspective, institutional logics can be defined as “the socially constructed, 
historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by 
which individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and 
space, and provide meaning to their social reality” (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008: 101). 
Building on Friedland and Alford’s (1991) notion of institutional orders, Thornton et al. 
(2012) derive seven ideal types of meta-logics at the societal level: Family, Community, 
Religion, State, Market, Profession, and Corporation. These macro institutional logics 
can be translated at the micro level of the individual as well as at the meso levels of 
the field or the organization. 
The likelihood of a multiple translation of these meta-logics at each infra-societal level 
gave rise to the concept of “constellations of logics” (Goodrick & Reay, 2011) to 
designate the combination of meta-logics embedded in a specific individual, field, or 
organization. The relationships between the macro logics composing the constellation 
may be either competitive or cooperative. Goodrick and Reay (2011), as well as 
Waldroff et al. (2013), found two distinct forms of cooperative relationships in 
healthcare settings: facilitative relationships, in which a practice consistent with one 
logic may strengthen another logic; and additive relationships, in which “a particular 
work task reflects the influence of more than one logic” (Waldroff et al., 2013: 103). 
These findings therefore highlight the possibility of a hybridization of plural logics in 
work practice.  
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Associated with this potential of hybridization comes the notion of agency, meaning an 
actor’s capacity to impact the social world by influencing rules, relation ties and 
distribution of resources (Scott, 2008). Waldroff et al. (2013) suggest that hybridization 
allows idiosyncratic arrangements of institutional logics at the micro level, and that this 
discretion provides agency for social actors. They also demonstrate that, while certain 
combinations of macro logics at the micro level may enable action, some others 
constrain it. 
Transposing this theoretical framework at the meso organizational level of the hospital 
implied considering the institutional logics guiding actors in their organizational 
behavior. As longitudinal studies of management control in French hospitals (Lartigau 
& Nobre, 2011; Bérard, 2013) had highlighted the systemic nature of that function, our 
first task was to construct a generic representation of the systemic interplay between 
organizational actors within hospitals, from the point of view of one of these actors: the 
management controller.  
 
Methodology  
Focus groups had previously proved to be a valuable research method in healthcare 
studies to generate data in the form of a collective representation by an occupational 
group (Liamputtong, 2011; Kitzinger, 1995). We seized the opportunity given by the 
creation of a community of practice dedicated to management control in French public 
and non-profit hospitals to prompt reflexivity among community members over their 
work practice (Schön, 1983). We asked them to detail all the tasks or roles they 
deemed necessary to implement management control systems in hospitals, and to 
identify the organizational actors who should, in their opinion, perform these tasks or 
roles. 
We conducted this collective analysis through workshops where participants had to fill 
in and discuss factsheets describing their work practice. 15 focus group meetings were 
held from November 2012 to September 2014, involving 32 management controllers 
from 30 hospitals of various status, size, and activity, and 2 management controllers 
working in regional health authorities. In addition, the factsheets were debated and 
supplemented in 10 community meetings, to which all 71 community members were 
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invited. Eventually, printed versions of factsheets were reviewed by 14 community 
members, bringing final modifications and further materials. 
Since focus group participants and other community members frequently pointed out 
their position in the organizational structure as a key determinant of their work practice, 
we looked for statistical data to verify this assertion. Although the National Observatory 
on Analytical Accountings (OCAH), run by the French Ministry of Health, indicated the 
positioning of management control’s teams in 528 public and non-profit hospitals, no 
information was available to evaluate the impact of these different positions on 
management controllers’ scope of action. We subsequently launched, in February and 
March 2014, an online survey, asking management controllers currently in office in 
public and non-profit French hospitals to weigh the pros and cons of their position in 
the structure of their organization. The survey was broadcast in and by the community 
of practice to 126 respondents. The results of the inquiry were analyzed and 
commented by 14 community members in a last focus group meeting held in December 
2014.  
Data analysis 
The 242 tasks or roles mentioned in final versions of the factsheets were grouped by 
organizational actors and coded according to their underlying macro societal logics. 
Subsequently, tasks in relation with cost-efficiency, market share analyses, or profit 
maximization, were considered as reflecting the market logic. Similarly, bureaucratic 
roles or tasks embedded in a hierarchical form of control were seen as pertaining to 
the corporate logic. Tasks or roles giving responsibility to health professionals in the 
organization and control of their work, endowing them with autonomous corporate 
decision power or granting them discretionary resources, were deemed proof of the 
professional logic. Tasks or roles undertaken to comply with instructions from 
governmental or regional health authorities were linked to the state logic. Finally, tasks 
or role involving members of the local environment were judged in correspondence 
with the community logic. We found no evidence of a family or a religious logic in our 
dataset. 
The tasks or roles of each organizational actor were coded using a linear numerical 
evaluation model, in which the score of each logic (y) comprised in a task or role is an 
inverted function of the number of logics (x) implied in that task or role, the regression 
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constant of the equation (a) being the total number of logics in the system: 5. The level 
of hybridity of logics in an organizational actor’s behavior was measured by calculating 
the Relative Standard Deviation (RSD) between the scores obtained by this actor for 
each logic. A low RSD meaning a low cleavage between numerical values, it signals 
an organizational behavior homogeneously guided by all logics, and thereby a high 
degree of hybridity. Inversely, a high RSD indicates a relatively segmented, less hybrid, 
behavior. 
Table 1 below shows the results of our initial coding, which will be completed in our full 
paper by multiple coding and inter-coder reliability analysis. 
Table 1: Prevalence of Institutional Logics in each Actor’s Behavior 
Actors :  
Number 
of tasks 
/ roles 
Score of 
market 
logic 
Score of 
corporate 
logic 
Score of 
prof. 
logic 
Score 
of state 
logic 
Score 
of com. 
logic 
Relative 
Standard 
Deviation 
Management 
controller 63 
20% 61% 19% 0% 0% 
112,12% 
Head of 
Medical 
Information 
Department 27 
34% 43% 23% 0% 0% 
87,79% 
Medical 
departments' 
"managerial 
teams" 54 
10% 26% 63% 0% 0% 
118,36% 
Chief 
Executive 
Director 39 
16% 75% 5% 4% 0% 
140,67% 
Finance 
Director 30 
13% 83% 2% 2% 0% 
160,12% 
Other 
Directors 28 
16% 75% 7% 2% 0% 
140,31% 
Supervisory 
Board 1 
0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
200,00% 
Total  242 
20% 61% 19% 0% 0% 
  
Prevalence 
of each logic 
in the 
system   17,49% 57,78% 23,28% 1,03% 0,41%   
 
Besides, our survey data proved to be consistent with national statics provided by the 
OCAH, since it showed the same three main structural positions of management 
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control in a similar distribution. 81 meaningful answers could be exploited to assess 
the most common position, under the Finance Director’s authority, 17 to explore the 
association with the Chief Executive Director, and only 4 to address the segmenting of 
management control in a specific department, sometimes teamed with the Head of 
Medical Information Department (HMID). Examining these results in the last focus 
group meeting supplemented this data with respectively 8, 2 and 2 instances of each 
position. The synthesis of the benefits and limitations of each structural configuration 
of management control expressed by survey and focus group participants will be 
displayed in the full paper.  
 
Presentation and discussion of main findings 
Considering the hybridity of logics in the overall management control system, the 
constellation of logics (Goodrick & Reay, 2011) described in Table 1 comprises five 
macro societal logics, of which one is more influential. The corporate logic, totalizing 
57% of all actors’ scores, is significantly more prevalent than the professional (23%) or 
the market (17%) logics. The state and community logics appear as residual, with a 
respective prevalence of 1% and 0.4%. Management control systems in French public 
and non-profit hospitals therefore fall into the first of the three types of constellations 
identified by Goodrick and Reay (2011): to wit, a constellation characterized by one 
dominant logic. For the purpose of this short paper, we wittingly limited our analysis to 
the macro-societal logics identified in our theoretical framework. Nevertheless, as early 
institutional approaches in hospitals revealed the presence of other societal logics, like 
law (Heimer, 1999), the comprehensiveness of this framework will be questioned in 
our full paper.  
This dominance of the corporate logic in hospitals’ management control systems 
reveals the impact of organizational embedment over the implementation of field 
logics. Indeed, whereas the French “managerial approach in hospitals” (Engel et al., 
2000) emphasized, at the field level, the market logic, and aimed at promoting more 
professional logic in hospitals’ governance, the main organizational embodiment of that 
logic in hospitals’ structure, namely management control, is primarily guided by a 
corporate logic. As a result, it can be asserted that structural responses of 
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organizations to institutional complexity are not always strictly homothetic translations 
of the constellations of logics promoted at their field level.  
Considering the hybridity of logics at each actor’s level, the system forged by 
management control in hospitals looks rather segmented, as all of the actors present 
high RSD of logics. Whereas directors, including the Chief Executive, are 
unambiguously marked by the corporate logic, imbuing at least 75% of their 
organizational behavior, medical departments’ heads and nurse coordinators remain 
mostly pervaded (at 63%) by the professional logic, in spite of their corporative function 
within the organization. The community logic, marginal in the system, is supported by 
only one actor: the Supervisory Board. This high level of segmentation within the 
system of management control supports Greewood’s (2011) definition of the hospital 
as a structural hybrid, meaning that differentiation of logics is clearly visible in the 
organizational structure. 
The synthesis of the survey and focus group participants’ answers about the benefits 
and limitations of their positions in hospitals’ structures enables us to single out hybdrid 
actors’ agency as a cooperative factor in that context. Indeed, both survey and focus 
participants highlighted that the isolation, in a segmented compartment of the structure, 
of the two actors displaying the lowest RSD, namely management control and the 
HMID, was the position granting these actors the largest scope of action, and, at the 
same time, allowing the best linkage between medical departments and administrators. 
Structural configurations binding management control to directors were depicted as 
detrimental to cooperation within the system, as management controllers were in these 
cases perceived by medical departments as serving only the corporate logic. 
Although the relative impact of cooperative and competitive structural patterns on 
organizational performance is yet to be determined, these findings already reflect at 
the organizational level Waldroff et al.’s (2013) observations on the relationships 
between combinations of institutional logics and action. For instance, our results 
confirm that additive relationships between logics constrain organizational action, 
especially in those configurations where a hybrid actor is associated with a less hybrid 
one. Similarly, transposing at the organizational level the mechanisms enabling action 
demands relevant structural designs: as examples, strengthening alternative logics 
means empowering the actors bearing these logics, and favoring facilitative 
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relationships between logics requires win-win solutions like profit-sharing between 
organizational actors. 
 
Conclusion 
As a whole, our results highlight that the translation of a constellation of logics in an 
organizational context implies considering how this arrangement of logics is reflected 
within the organizational structure. If the structure is segmented, as in the case of 
hospitals, the cooperative or competitive nature of the relationship between institutional 
logics will be shaped by the structural configurations linking organizational actors. 
Hybrid actors play a key role in these configurations since their hybridity allows them 
to bridge gaps between segmented actors. However, the performance of this 
intermediation in both cooperative and competitive arrangements should be looked 
upon in our full paper, in order to assess the relevance of the different configurations 
of management control as structural responses to institutional complexity.  
Besides, further research would be warranted, and probably continued beyond our 
future full paper, to include privately-owned clinics, as previous works have underlined 
that hospitals’ ownership may affect the prevalence of logics in these organizations 
under certain circumstances (Goodrick and Salancik, 1996). International comparison 
would also be justified, since comparative studies have shown that constellations of 
logics may vary from one country to another in responding to the same healthcare 
issues (Waldroff et. al, 2013). Finally, other types of structural responses to institutional 
complexity in hospitals could be explored, like liaison structures, which have already 
been observed at the field level (Reay & Hinings, 2009).  
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